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Two and two make four/ They never make five
And as long as we know it/ We can all survive
(Graham Nash, Songs for Beginners)
In 1996, Barton writes, “Very little of the ethnomathematical
literature is explicit about its philosophical stance”, which he
considers to be “one of the areas” that “must be addressed
if the subject is to gain wider legitimacy in mathematical cir-
cles” (p. 201). Seven years later, Adam, Alangui and Barton
(2003) take issue with a recent, critical investigation of eth-
nomathematics, especially of its relationship with academic
mathematics regarding teaching and learning. They dismiss
the largely philosophical questions raised by Rowlands and
Carson (2002) by suggesting that “the role of ethnomathe-
matics in mathematics education is now predominantly an
empirical matter” (p. 327).
What has happened in the interim that has contributed to
this seeming shift? Is it true, now that the political and philo-
sophical/conceptual questions have been taken care of, that
ethnomathematics is used successfully “as a framework in
the teaching of mathematics” (Adam et al., 2003, p. 334)?
This view appears to rely for its plausibility partly on the
work discussed in the first two International Congresses on
Ethnomathematics (Contreras, Morales and Ramírez (eds),
1999; de Monteiro (ed.), 2002) and by Barton himself
(1999b) and partly on studies in so-called indigenous knowl-
edge. The underlying idea is that a philosophical, conceptual
inquiry regarding ethnomathematics is now dated – and that
any critique must address the empirical issues around cur-
ricular reliance on ethnomathematics and evaluate the results. 
My aim in this article is twofold. I argue that any dis-
missal of philosophical engagement with the plausibility and
viability of ethnomathematics on the grounds alluded to
above smacks of mere verbal legislation. Furthermore, I will
illustrate, through an analysis and critique of recent per-
spectives, that the philosophical debate around ethno-
mathematics is both alive and warranted – indeed, crucial. I
argue that ‘ethnomathematics’ makes, at best, limited sense,
namely insofar as it is understood as describing indigenous
mathematical practices.
Seeking refuge in research on indigenous knowledge is
misguided, in that the idea of ‘indigenous knowledge’ faces
serious and potentially fatal objections (see Horsthemke,
2004a; Horsthemke 2004b).
Moreover, very few philosophical debates have dated.
Very few philosophical puzzles and problems have been
resolved. (The freedom/ determinism debate and the mind-
body problem may be among these few.) So, to suggest that
ethnomathematics has shifted towards predominantly
empirical matters is to proceed in terms of unwarranted ver-
bal arbitration. Insofar as ethnomathematics continues to
involve a questionable understanding of knowledge and
truth, any such ruling is likely to beg the question of the
validity and conceptual soundness of the ethnomathematical
enterprise.
Shifts in definition and direction, and current
developments
In his 1996 article, Barton traces definitional shifts within
ethnomathematics by examining chronologically the work
of D’Ambrosio, Gerdes and Ascher, respectively. He
explores the development of ethnomathematics ‘into a
research programme, with a broader referent’, that
now includes: a) the formation of all knowledge
(D’Ambrosio), b) mathematics in relation to society
(Gerdes); and c) mathematical ideas wherever they
occur (Ascher). (Barton, 1996, p. 210)
Building on these ideas, Barton presents the following defi-
nition:
Ethnomathematics is a research programme of the way
in which cultural groups understand, articulate and use
the concepts and practices which we describe as math-
ematical, whether or not the cultural group has a
concept of mathematics. (2004, p. 214)
D’Ambrosio’s understanding is strikingly similar but also
contains an emphasis on both philosophy and pedagogy:
Ethnomathematics is a research programme in the his-
tory and philosophy of mathematics, with pedagogical
implications, focusing the arts and techniques (tics
[from techne]) of explaining, understanding and coping
with (mathema) different socio-cultural environments
(ethno). (D’Ambrosio [2], 1985)
Barton’s article constitutes an “attempt to note […] the cur-
rent directions in ethnomathematics” and “other well-
established developments”: the “use of resources derived
from other cultures in mathematics education” (1999a, p.
32) or what might be called the cultural resource direction,
one that appears to have a predominantly practical or empir-
ical focus; D’Ambrosio, Gerdes and the “humanistic
mathematics” direction; and “the academic debate concern-
ing the philosophy, legitimacy and relationships with other
disciplines and theories”, that is, “the critical mathematics
direction” (ibid, p. 32). These different “directions” are
clearly intimately linked and the boundaries between the
cultural resource direction, the humanistic mathematics
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direction and the critical mathematics direction overlap, as
Barton acknowledges later (2004, p. 22). 
Three years later, Rowlands and Carson publish a critical
review of some of the ethnomathematics literature. In
response to the question, “What would an ethnomathematics
curriculum look like and where would formal, academic
mathematics fit in such a curriculum?”, they argue that 
it is only through the lens of formal, academic mathe-
matics sensitive to cultural differences that the real
value of the mathematics inherent in certain cultures
and societies be understood and appreciated. (Row-
lands and Carson, 2002, pp. 80, 79)
In their response to Rowlands and Carson, Adam et al. con-
tend that
debate on cultural issues in mathematics […] must be
based on contemporary writing in the field, and should
not focus on extreme views within the political justifi-
cation for ethnomathematics [and assert that] the role of
ethnomathematics in mathematics education is now
predominantly an empirical matter. (Adam et al., 2003,
p. 327)
This contention evidently begs the question of the validity
and soundness of the concept of ethnomathematics. It mis-
takenly assumes general agreement on what ethnomathe-
matics is and on its “legitimacy in mathematical circles”
(1996, p. 201), to use Barton’s earlier phrase.
After noting two perspectives on ethnomathematics, the
“political perspective”, “now more often related to writing
on indigenous knowledge” (Adam et al., 2003, p. 328), and
the philosophical perspective (including the question of
“mathematical relativity”), the authors assert, 
Whether [… an ethnomathematical] perspective helps
fulfil the aims of conventional mathematics is no longer
a question that is debated on ideological lines. For
some time it has been regarded as an open empirical
question by most of those working in ethnomathemat-
ics. (Adam et al., 2003, p. 330)
Does this not amount to verbal legislation? The claim that
this is the view of “most of those working in ethnomathe-
matics” fails to establish anything.
The authors state, further, that
[e]ducational research is so far demonstrating the suc-
cess in conventional terms of at least one ethno-
mathematical approach to the curriculum. Any critique
of this field must address such results and evaluate them
as research. It must enter current debates. It cannot be
ideologically directed, nor is it helpful to address anti-
quated or extreme positions. (Adam et al., 2003, p. 333)
Adam et al. cite the work done in Alaska (described in Lipka,
2002) as an example of “students who have been taught
using such an ethnomathematical curriculum [and who] per-
form better on conventional mathematics tests” (2003,
p. 333). Yet, they miss the essential points of the critique of
ethnomathematics: which is to interrogate what is “culturally
specific” or “unique” about this approach and – if indeed it is
so specific or unique – whether it is “mathematics”. This
critique has little, if anything, to do with “ideology”. On the
contrary, it is informed by a plea for conceptual clarity and
argumentational rigour.
Finally, in their endorsement of
an integration of the mathematical concepts and prac-
tices originating in the learners’ culture with those of
conventional, formal academic mathematics’, (p. 332)
the authors do not address Rowlands and Carson’s concerns.
The latter do not “claim that mathematics should be taught
in an artificial setting without relating it to the real-world
whatsoever” (Adam et al., 2003, p. 333; Rowlands and Car-
son, 2004, p. 336). Instead, they argue that 
a teacher ought to be sensitive to cultural experience
[… but] to confuse the boundaries between cultural
experience and high-order abstract concepts in mathe-
matics is to confuse different cultural systems […] All
good teachers should be aware of the cognitive state
of their students, but that awareness can be achieved by
how the student responds to the mediation of high-
order concepts. This does not mean connecting
high-order concepts with cultural experience. (Row-
lands and Carson, 2002, pp. 96, 97, 98)
It might be argued (as Alangui did, in conversation with me
at the recent Auckland ICEm-3) that sensitivity to cultural
experience and awareness of students’ cognitive state are
insubstantial and woefully inadequate for addressing the
deeper concerns, like the effects of physical and mental col-
onization. My question is, however, what work does a focus
on ‘ethnomathematics’ do that a rights-based approach does
not or cannot do? ‘Rights’ may be an occidental idea (and
certainly not a failsafe one at that), but it is arguably a use-
ful tool for addressing issues of social justice and redress.
In a recent article, Barton usefully distinguishes between
“mathematical” knowledge and “practical” knowledge (for
example, the “mathematical” practices of artisans):
There have been many studies done on these issues:
studies in ethnomathematics, studies in mathematics
education, studies in situated cognition, studies in
anthropology, studies in the history of mathematics and
studies in indigenous knowledge. […W]riting in one
area has been criticised as if it was from another. Row-
lands and Carson’s (2002) critique of ethnomathe-
matics as if it is an educational movement is a case in
point, the rebuttal (Adam, Alangui and Barton, 2003)
differentiating between the open educational questions,
and the ethnomathematical issue of relativity in math-
ematical thought. (2004, p. 22)
Again, Barton misses the (meta-)issue here. The critique
concerns the very plausibility of ethnomathematics and
indigenous knowledge. In order to make sense of ideas like
‘relativity’ and ‘cultural specificity’ in mathematics (educa-
tion), reference to the distinction between ‘mathematical’
and ‘practical’ knowledge is crucial. Yet, such reference is
usually unavailable within ‘studies in ethnomathematics’.
Tellingly, Barton notes that 
the boundaries between these areas of study overlap –
the differences are often ones of emphasis and focus
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rather than distinct features. Furthermore, many writers
deliberately address more than one of these areas in
the same article. (2004, p. 23) 
The confusion between theoretical and practical knowledge
seems to lie at the heart of the defence of ethnomathematics
and of indigenous knowledge in general. I attempt to address
this confusion, with particular reference to the ideas of rela-
tivity and/or cultural specificity of mathematics.
Knowledge and truth: the problems of rela-
tivity and cultural specificity
After presenting his definition of ethnomathematics, Barton
announces,
Both “mathematics” and “mathematical” are culturally
specific because their referents depend upon who is
using the terms. (1996, p. 214)
He claims that there are four implications of his definition:
(a) ethnomathematics is not a mathematical study, it is
more like anthropology or history; (b) the definition
itself depends on who is stating it, and it is culturally
specific; (c) the practice which it describes is also cul-
turally specific; and (d) ethnomathematics implies some
form of relativism for mathematics. (1996, p. 215)
Before I examine the idea of mathematical relativism in
greater detail, I want to comment briefly on Barton’s elabo-
rations of points (b) and (c). He writes, 
The definition of ethnomathematics is culturally spe-
cific: it is written from the point of view of one culture
or social grouping, namely a culture or social grouping
which has a conceptual category named “mathematics”.
[…] Part of the purpose of ethnomathematics is to chal-
lenge the universal nature of mathematics, and to expose
different mathematical conceptions. If this is success-
ful, then ethnomathematics is also specific to one
particular concept of mathematics. Thus a universal def-
inition is not possible. (1996, p. 216; emphasis added)
Barton accepts that his preferred definition of ethnomathe-
matics, too, is culturally specific, so he cannot be accused
of inconsistency in this regard. However, this move renders
‘other’ mathematics opaque or unintelligible, and perhaps
useless, to anyone outside the specific culture. Even more
seriously, ethnomathematics is rendered immune to interro-
gation from without, a sleight of hand I find deeply
disturbing intellectually. Yet, Barton is inconsistent in
another regard. At bottom, he appears to be unaware of the
tension between the claim that the definition of ethnomath-
ematics is culturally specific and the claim that part of its
purpose is to challenge the universal (or transcultural) nature
of mathematics. Is this purpose also culturally specific?
Moreover, the verdict that a universal definition is not pos-
sible presumably has universal purchase. Or is it culturally
specific, too? Barton is silent on these issues. Finally, if it is
correct that ethnomathematics is “more like anthropology or
history”, it is unclear how its definition can be culturally
specific. Barton’s is a theoretical definition and, as such, is
subject to transcultural evaluation. A theoretical definition
can be seen to be more or less useful – and can also be out-
right incorrect, unlike a stipulative definition. The assertion
that the practice described by ethnomathematics is cultur-
ally specific makes good sense. However, Barton adds,
If the practice of ethnomathematics is carried out with
integrity, there will be cognisance of those aspects of
the practices and concepts which are other-culture
based and which may not, initially, be considered math-
ematics. (p. 217)
Yet, who judges whether “the practice of ethnomathematics”
is “carried out with integrity”, and on what grounds? Will
this not also involve a culturally specific judgement and/or
set of criteria? It would appear that those who are univer-
salists (or transculturalists) about definition and judgement
find themselves on logically more compelling grounds.
His definition, Barton says, ‘implies two senses in which
mathematics is universal, and two senses in which it is rela-
tive’ (p. 218). I take the former two to be uncontroversial,
indeed commonsensical, and will not discuss them here. My
focus, rather, will be on the alleged senses in which mathe-
matics is relative. 
Regarding the first of these, Barton says that 
mathematics must be changing. This change needs to
be more than just an evolutionary building on what has
gone before, it must be revolutionary. (p. 218)
There are well-documented problems with this kind of rela-
tivism regarding (revolutionary) change, in mathematics as
elsewhere (see Horsthemke, 2004b, pp. 575, 576). To pro-
vide just one example, if successive or ‘alternative’ para-
digms are incommensurable, then a new or ‘other’ paradigm
cannot be established to be superior. Barton writes,
Ethnomathematics must admit the possibility of other
mathematical concepts which are not subsumable by
existing ones, or by some new, overarching generaliza-
tion. This is not to say that all ethnomathematical study
will generate alternative mathematics. What is necessary
is the idea that it could happen: that new ideas could
transform the way mathematics is conceived. (p. 218)
And presumably still be able to call it mathematics (see Bar-
ton’s point that mathematics “exists as a knowledge
category” (p. 218)). It follows from this that there is no such
thing as ‘alternative mathematics’: it either is or is not ‘math-
ematics’ proper. (This will become clearer in what follows.)
Regarding the second sense in which mathematics is
relative, 
there must be a recognition that mathematics is not the
only way to see the world, nor is it the only way to see
those aspects of the world commonly referred to as
mathematical, i.e. having to do with number, shape and
relationships. What is more, there needs to be a recog-
nition that alternative ways of seeing these phenomena
are legitimate and valid. For if they are not legitimate,
then there will be no point in trying to study them, there
would only be point in trying to “educate” those who
do not see it in the “correct” way. (p. 219)
First, this is no argument for seeing alternative ways (of
seeing aspects of the world commonly referred to as mathe-
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matical) as legitimate or valid. Indeed, one might simply
acknowledge that, on epistemological and truth-functional
grounds, they are not legitimate and that there is no point in
studying them, other than as anthropological curiosities (like
numerology, and the like). Second, reference to “alternative
ways of seeing” seems to be misconceived. If a particular
alternative procedure can be shown before “the community
of mathematicians” (Barton, 2004, p. 23) to work, then it is
not called alternative anymore. It is just mathematics.
Barton claims that the 
use of ethnomathematics as a theoretical tool can be
seen as a practical way of acknowledging the reflexiv-
ity of [the] relativistic viewpoint: it is the differing
conceptions of the field which make it a valuable tool
in on-going political and educational debates. We
acknowledge that our own conceptions are context-
derived, but use that knowledge to continue our work.
(1999a, p. 34)
Here, as elsewhere, he appears to be unaware of the tension
between the ‘relativistic viewpoint’ and universal knowl-
edge, that is, advancing these ideas as universal knowledge
claims. He writes, “It is an assumption of ethnomathemat-
ics that thinking about quantity, relationships and space may
vary between cultural groups” (1999a, p. 34). Okay – but
this does not, indeed cannot, mean that the various views are
all equally valid, or that they indicate fundamental differ-
ences in mathematical orientation. Barton’s final point may
indicate a somewhat conciliatory approach, but it contains
the mistaken assumption that ethnomathematics is a unique
and distinct “field of knowledge”.
Adam et al. write that the “political perspective on eth-
nomathematics […] is now more often related to writing on
indigenous knowledge”, before claiming that “[p]rivileging
some peoples’ ideas in the discourse of mathematics while
denying others’ is colonialism” (2003, p. 328). “Such
views”, according to the authors, 
justify the need for indigenous mathematicians to
engage in ethnomathematics because indigenous
knowledge and value systems are under attack.
Decolonisation involves reclaiming, protecting and
valuing the unique ways of indigenous knowing and
doing […] Indigenous mathematicians engage in eth-
nomathematics because we know that our peoples have
complex knowledge systems that are valuable and
could teach the outside world alternative ways of know-
ing. (2003, pp. 328, 329; emphasis mine)
The idea of indigenous ways of doing being unique is cer-
tainly plausible. However, apart from relying on the
unwarranted assumption that ‘indigenous knowledge’ is an
unproblematic notion, this perception is mistaken in a fur-
ther respect. If anything, ‘privileging’ or ‘denying’ views
happens on the basis of the respective knowledge or truth
content, not on the basis of who holds them. Moreover, if
these are genuine “ways of knowing”, then they would no
longer be alternative. They would be part and parcel of
‘knowing’ as such. If Adam et al. wish to preserve the qual-
ification ‘alternative’, then what they are referring to,
presumably, is not ‘knowing’ but ‘believing’. When the
authors assert that ‘alternative systems of relationships and
their meanings […] are important to the growth of mathe-
matical knowledge’, they take this to indicate not that
‘another world is still possible for indigenous people’ but
that such a world ‘already exists’ (2003, p. 329). Does this
mean that all indigenous worldviews, however ill-founded,
are equally valid?
According to Adam et al., the 
political perspective is just one of many in the ethno-
mathematical field. The philosophical issues are also
far-reaching and widely debated. To name just one
example, the question of mathematical relativity is
implied by ethnomathematics and needs justification.
(2003, p. 329)
The authors bring this perspective to bear also on their dis-
cussion of ‘rationality’:
Greek rationality is only one form of rationality, and
[…] the particular form of mathematics that traces its
trajectory through a Greek tradition (and a few others)
serves particular functions and has particular conse-
quences. […] However, to use this particular form of
mathematics as the standard by which mathematics is
to be judged misses the point. (2003, p. 330)
What point?, one might ask. Clearly, in the absence of any
kind of argument in favour of (for example) culture-specific
rationality, the authors’ claim here amounts to little more than
bald assertion. Moreover, the claim that there are several
(equally valid) forms of rationality renders it impossible to
evaluate competing knowledge claims. Even more seriously,
any kind of behaviour or worldview could be accounted for
and rendered immune to condemnation, in terms of employ-
ing or engaging a “different form of rationality”.
Barton explains that
[e]thnomathematics has its focus firmly fixed on math-
ematical knowledge – its aim is the illumination of this
knowledge, its methods are to expand the ambit of what
can be legitimately regarded as mathematics, by includ-
ing mathematical practices and systems wherever they
occur, and, in particular, where they occur in specific
contexts. (2004, p. 22; emphasis mine)
Barton’s initial emphasis of the distinction between mathe-
matical knowledge and practical knowledge notwith-
standing, this statement exemplifies the basic conceptual
confusion underlying the defence of both ethnomathemat-
ics and indigenous knowledge, namely what is in the final
analysis a conflation of theoretical and practical knowledge.
Regarding the question, “How does ethnomathematics
extend mathematical knowledge?”, Barton points to “some
examples of direct contributions from culturally specific
knowledge to the general body of conventional mathemat-
ics” (2004, p. 23; as an example, he cites Ascher, 2002). I
suggest that the idea of “culturally specific knowledge”
makes sense only with regard to practical knowledge or
“mathematical practices” – but not when it is taken to refer
to theoretical (mathematical) knowledge. Theoretical, fac-
tual or propositional knowledge cannot be culturally specific
or relative. Neither can truth. Mathematical truths hold tran-
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sculturally. My hunch is that when ethnomathematicians and
indigenous knowledge apologists speak of culturally spe-
cific knowledge or of truth being relative, they are actually
referring either to practices or to beliefs.
An evaluation of the research around and application of
so-called ‘alternative’ mathematics is necessarily and cor-
rectly conducted against the background of ‘formal,
academic’ mathematics. Having said this, I do not share
Rowlands and Carson’s view that
[the] conversation [between critics and defenders of
ethnomathematics, [… i]n addition to purely mathe-
matical issues, […] involves questions of historical
injury and contemporary relationships between cultural
groups whose values are incommensurable. (2004, p.
329; emphasis added)
In fact, I would suggest that it is precisely the pernicious cul-
tural and ethical relativism invoked here that would make
‘conversation’ impossible. On the contrary, I wish to argue –
and my recent ICEm-3 experience strongly bears this out –
that the degree of convergence between values and priorities
is striking and that, despite some historical and cultural
divergence in approaches, there is a common commitment to
discussion and argument, as well as to standards of reason-
ing about matters that concern us most. [2]
Notes
[1] Taken from Ubiratan D’Ambrosio’s (2006) powerpoint presentation
‘Ethnomathematics: the scenario 30 years after’, plenary presentation,
Third International Conference on Ethnomathematics (ICEm-3): Cultural
Connections and Mathematical Manipulations, Auckland, New Zealand. 
[2] On this note, I wish to thank Bill Barton and his team for making ICEm-
3 the intellectual and human success it was. My heartfelt thanks go to all the
delegates with whom I had personal conversations, especially Gelsa Kni-
jnik, Ubiratan d’Ambrosio, Willy Alangui, Bill Barton, Ivan Reilly and to
my dear friend and colleague Marc Schäfer.
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